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Abstract 
This study examines the interactive relationship between three dimensions of safety 
climate (management commitment to safety, priority of safety, and pressure for 
production), and their impact on risk behavior reported by employees. The sample 
consisted of 623 employees from a chemical manufacturing organization in South 
Africa. Hierarchical regression analyses were carried out to test the direct effects and 
the interaction effect of the three safety climate dimensions on risk behavior. The 
results showed that, as expected, employees’ risk behavior was negatively related to 
management commitment to safety and priority of safety and positively related to 
pressure for production. Moreover, as expected, the three-way interaction between 
management commitment to safety, priority of safety and pressure for production was 
significant. When pressure for production was high, management commitment to 
safety was positively related to risk behavior, regardless of level of priority of safety 
on plant. When pressure for production was low, the effect of management 
commitment to safety on risk behavior was nullified under conditions of high, as 
compared to low priority of safety on plant. These findings highlight the importance 
of managerial commitment to safety in contexts where employees experience tensions 
between production deadlines and safety procedures.  
Keywords: Safety Climate; Risk behavior; Safety Performance; Chemical 




The importance of safety climate and its relationship with occupational safety has 
been established across a range of industry settings (Flin et al., 2000; Clarke, 2006; 
Nahrgang et al., 2008; Christian et al., 2009). Safety climate relates to individuals’ 
perceptions of safety policies, procedures, practices and behaviors in the work 
environment that indicate the true priority given to safety relative to other 
organizational goals (e.g. Naveh et al., 2005; Neal and Griffin, 2006; Nahrgang et al., 
2008; Morrow et al., 2010). Safety climate is associated with safety practices (Zohar, 
1980), compliance with safety standards (Goldenhar et al., 2003), lower occurrence of 
workplace accidents (Griffin and Neal, 2000; Zohar, 2003; Clarke, 2006) and has also 
been found to predict safety behavior (Hofmann and Stetzer, 1996; Cooper and 
Phillips, 2004). Safety climate can therefore be considered as an important variable 
for understanding safety performance and is used as a leading indicator of unsafe 
work conditions (Zohar, 1980; Flin et al., 2000; Cooper and Philips, 2004; Hoffmann 
and Mark, 2006). However, despite its predictive validity many authors emphasize the 
need for further research which explains how specific features of safety climate are 
associated with one another and consequently with safety behavior (e.g. Prussia et al., 
2003; Pousette et al., 2008; Wirth and Sigurdsson, 2008). In line with this, Zohar 
(2010) argues that safety climate perceptions should move beyond an isolated focus 
on safety, toward an evaluation which incorporates the relative priorities among the 
various safety policies, procedures and practices and their competing domains (e.g. 
productivity or efficiency).  
 
This paper, using an adapted version of the Offshore Safety Questionnaire (OSQ) 
(Mearns et al., 1997; Fleming, 2001), examines three dimensions of safety climate, 
that is 1) management commitment to safety, 2) priority of safety in the workplace 
and 3) pressure for production, and the relationship among them as predictors of risk 
behavior reported by employees working in a chemical manufacturing organization 
situated in South Africa. Risk behavior, which refers to the extent to which employees 
ignore safety regulations to get the job done, carry out forbidden activities, and 
perform their duties incorrectly (Rundmo and Hale, 2003), has been related to 
accident involvement in previous research and is therefore an appropriate 
measurement of employee’s safety behavior (e.g. Rundmo, 1995; Mearns et al., 1997; 
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Flemming, 1999). Regular non-compliance with policies, procedures and safety rules 
are considered a major cause of accidents as it can make the entire system more 
vulnerable to failure (Reason, 1997; Neal and Griffin, 2006; Baysari et al.,2008). In 
line with recent research (e.g. Katz-Navon et al., 2005; Naveh et al., 2005), this study 
examines the interplay of safety climate dimensions and therefore extends the existing 
literature by 1) testing whether the observed relationship between management 
commitment to safety and priority of safety is also dependent on pressure for 
production and 2) examines the complex pattern of relationships among these three 
safety climate dimensions in their influence on risk behavior. Understanding how 
specific dimensions of safety climate may influence risk behavior will enable 
organizations to balance competing organizational priorities (productivity and safety 
compliance) and thereby minimize unsafe behavior in the workplace.  
 
2.0 Psychological Safety Climate  
The level of conceptualization and analysis of safety climate is a continuing debate 
among climate researchers; climate can be investigated at different levels of the 
organization (Rousseau, 1985). Psychological safety climate, which is the focus of the 
present study, reflects individual perceptions of safety policies, procedures, and 
practices in the workplace (Christian et al., 2009). These non-aggregated perceptions 
of the work environment (Clarke, 2009) differ from safety climate at the group or 
organizational level, which represent collective perceptions of workplace safety. 
Although safety climate has traditionally been conceptualized and operationalized at 
the organizational level (e.g. Zohar, 1980), there is growing evidence for the 
informative and predictive nature of safety climate at both workgroup and individual 
level (Zohar, 2003; Neal and Griffin, 2006; Zohar and Luria, 2005). For example, a 
recent meta-analysis which examines the moderating effect of level of analysis in the 
safety climate-safety behavior relationship found that safety climate at both the 
individual and group level had similar magnitudes in the prediction of safety 
behavior, which were both slightly stronger than organizational level safety climate 
(Christian et al., 2009). Evidence for the prediction of safety behavior across various 
industries has also been found for psychological safety climate (Larsson et al., 2008; 
Morrow et al., 2010). In the present study we focus on psychological safety climate in 
order to examine the impact of varying employee interpretations regarding safety in 
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their workplace, possibly caused by idiosyncratic worldviews, perceptual biases, and 
experiences (Ostroff and Bowen, 2000), on individual behavior (i.e., risk behavior).  
Despite the importance of safety climate in the prediction of accidents in the 
workplace the dimensionality of safety climate (Zohar and Luria, 2005) and its factor 
structure (Zohar, 1980; Dedobbeleer and Beland, 1991) remains disputed. With regard 
to dimensionality, some researchers argue that safety climate can be regarded as a 
uni-dimensional latent variable (Neal et al., 2000) while others claim it is 
multidimensional in nature (Cooper and Phillips, 2004; Zohar and Luria, 2005). With 
regard to factor structure, research demonstrates the inability to reproduce factor 
structures across industries (Zohar, 1980; Dedobbeleer and Beland, 1991; Brown and 
Holmes, 1996), indicative of the problematic nature of measuring and 
operationalizing safety climate. In addition, a number of different measures of safety 
climate have been developed (e.g. Zohar 1980; Brown and Holmes, 1996; Hayes et 
al., 1998; Mearns et al., 1998; Dedobbeleer and Beland, 1991; Cox and Cheyne 2000; 
Shannon et al., 2001; Mearns et al., 2003). Therefore, to date no universal model 
specifying the definition and conceptualization of safety climate and its underlying 
key dimensions exists (Christian et al., 2009), although common themes have 
emerged (e.g. Flin et al., 2000). Zohar (2010) recently encouraged researchers to 
consider safety climate perceptions as targeted at system-level attributes which 
include the priority of competing demands (e.g. safety and efficiency), discrepancies 
between espoused and enacted safety practices, and consistencies among policies and 
procedures. It is therefore necessary to address safety climate from a multi-
dimensional perspective, which permits examination of potential interactions between 
its components in their impact on safety performance.  
 
3.0 Safety Climate Dimensions and Risk Behavior: Direct Effects 
Three safety climate dimensions in particular capture both competing organizational 
domains and consistency between policy and practice and have been regularly 
included in safety climate studies, namely, management commitment to safety, 
perceptions of the priority of safety in the workplace, and pressure for production 
(Mearns et al., 1998; Zohar, 2002; Cooper and Phillips, 2004). Although a number of 
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additional aspects of safety climate have been identified in the literature (e.g. safety 
knowledge, safety training), these three specific dimensions were chosen based on 
their frequent inclusion in safety climate studies in addition to evidence demonstrating 
their importance in predicting safe behavior beyond alternative safety dimensions. For 
example a number of review, field and meta-analytic studies examining a range of 
safety climate dimensions have demonstrated management commitment to safety as 
the strongest predictor of safety performance (e.g. Cox and Flin, 1998; Flin et al., 
2000; Christian et al., 2009; Beus et al., 2010). Priority of safety and pressure for 
production, despite having received less attention than management commitment to 
safety, are commonly used dimensions of safety climate which have been consistently 
found to predict safety outcomes such as unsafe behavior (e.g. Morrow et al., 2010). 
Furthermore Cox and Cheyne (2000), in developing a safety climate assessment tool, 
found that management commitment to safety, safety priority and the work 
environment (i.e. conflict between operational targets and safety) were deemed as 
some of the most highly ranked dimensions of safety climate for offshore workers. 
The impact of perceived managerial practices on safety performance has been widely 
demonstrated in previous research (e.g. Thompson et al., 1998; Zohar, 2002), and 
there is consensus that management actions are an important determinant in creating a 
safe work environment (see Shannon et al., 2001 for an overview). McLain and Jarrell 
(2007) have explained this effect by proposing that management commitment leads to 
trust in management which in turn leads to a) a reduction in the need for employees to 
divert attention to safety hazards while performing tasks, and b) greater information 
sharing about safety and safe actions. Managerial behavior provides cues regarding 
workplace norms and the kinds of behavior likely to be supported, valued or 
rewarded, which informs employees’ perceptions of safety climate (Zohar, 2003; 
Morrow et al., 2010). On a practical level it means that managers at all levels in the 
organization must visibly demonstrate their commitment towards safety as well as 
their support for safety in visible behaviors i.e. talk about safety, invest resources in 
creating a safe work environment, involve employees in safety matters, consideration 
of safety matters in job design and congruence between managerial safety talk and 
managerial actions (Zohar, 1980; Hoffmann and Stetzer, 1996; Geller, 2001; Clarke 
and Ward, 2006). It is important to note that safety climate, as a socially construed 
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indication of desired employee behavior, originates simultaneously from both policy 
and procedural actions of senior management and supervisory actions demonstrated 
by frontline or shop-floor supervisors (Zohar and Luria, 2005). The managerial level 
at which commitment is examined (i.e. senior manager, supervisor) is however 
ambiguous in some studies despite the large differences in their roles and perceived 
influence by employees (Clarke, 1999; Flin et al., 2000). In the present study we 
focus on employees’ perceptions of senior management commitment to safety as 
senior managers “undoubtedly set the tone and tempo for organizational atmosphere, 
establish priorities and allocate resources“ (Flin et al., 2000, p. 186) and as their 
safety policies, procedures, and actions are critical in limiting supervisor discretion in 
policy implementation (Zohar and Luria, 2005).  
 
Priority of safety as the second safety climate dimension refers to the degree to which 
safety is perceived as a top priority for employees (Naveh et al., 2005). A high safety 
priority within an organization means that safety is considered an important issue that 
must be given precedence regardless of other competing demands, such as work speed 
and productivity (Flemming, 1999). A high priority of safety can potentially motivate 
employees to take greater ownership of, and responsibility for, safety. This in turn, is 
likely to influence employee’s tendency to behave safely. A low safety priority 
denotes that safety-related policies and procedures are perceived only as rhetoric or as 
pretence and then they can be inadequately followed or even ignored without 
consequences (Falbruch and Wilpert, 1999). Fleming (1999) in a study of off-shore 
personnel, found that 19% of the variance in subordinate self-report safety behavior 
was explained by the priority of safety in the work environment and supervisory 
behavior. Dedobbeleer and Beland (1991) similarly found that workforce attitudes 
towards safety practices (i.e. propensity to take risks) were predicted by perceptions 
of management concern for employee well-being.  
 
Finally, the present study focuses on pressure for production as the third safety 
climate dimension. As managers generally place a high demand on workplace 
productivity it can often cause employees to compromise on safety (Wright, 1986; 
Langford et al., 2000). Although employee perceptions of work pressure (e.g. 
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excessive workload, high work pace, time pressures, etc.) are known to be a causal 
factor for both accidents and unsafe work behavior (Wright, 1986; Hoffmann and 
Stetzer, 1996; Brown et al., 2002; Goldenhar et al., 2003; Seo, 2005), work pressure 
has been found to have a small effect in predicting safety performance, accident and 
injuries relative to other safety climate dimensions according to meta-analytic 
research (Christian et al., 2009). The small effect observed for work pressure could 
suggest that it is not work pressure per se that causes accidents, but the perceived 
pressure to ignore safety rules. For example, although looking at employees’ attitudes 
rather than perceptions, Rundmo (1998a, b) found that an attitude amongst employees 
to accept rule violation is the strongest predictor of risk behavior. In the present study 
we therefore define and conceptualize pressure for production as an employee’s 
perception that the organization encourages him or her to work around safety 
procedures in order to meet production quotas, keep up with the flow of incoming 
work, or meet important deadlines (Brown et al., 2000). This definition is similar to 
previously examined constructs such as work-safety tension, i.e., workers perceive 
that working safely is at odds with effectively doing their jobs (Brown and Holmes, 
1986; Dedobbeleer and Beland, 1991; Morrow et al., 2010), and work pressure and 
safety rules (Wills et al., 2006) which were influential in predicting safety behaviors 
amongst drivers, production and construction workers. These findings are consistent 
with Mearns et al. (2001) who found that unsafe behavior, in a sample of off-shore oil 
workers, was primarily predicted by perceived pressure for production.  
 
To conclude, management commitment to safety, priority of safety, and pressure for 
production by employees have been deemed important dimensions of safety, which 
are predictive of unsafe behaviors. Based on our above review of the literature we 
expect these three dimensions to have a direct effect on risk behavior. Specifically, 
our Hypothesis 1 reads as follows:  
 
Hypothesis 1: (a) Management commitment to safety and (b) Priority of safety are 
negatively related to risk behavior as reported by employees. (c) Pressure for 





4.0   Safety Climate Dimensions and Risk Behavior: Interactive Effects 
Although there is strong evidence to support the direct relationship between each of 
the above dimensions of safety climate and safety behavior, research to date has 
largely ignored the possible relationships that exist between these safety climate 
dimensions in their impact on safety performance (Naveh et al., 2005; Beus et al., 
2010). Few researchers (Katz-Navon et al., 2005; Naveh et al., 2005) have recently 
demonstrated the intricate relationships between safety climate dimensions in their 
prediction of safety performance. For example, in their study of hospitals, Katz-
Navon and colleagues (2005) found that, when safety priority was high as opposed to 
low, the influence of managerial safety practices on the number of treatment errors 
was nullified. In other words, high priority of safety provided employees with 
sufficient cues regarding the importance of safety within their unit to the extent that 
managerial emphasis on safety had no additional influence. However in addition to 
employees’ evaluation of commitment to and priority of safety by management, 
climate perceptions are also guided by discrepancies between espoused and enacted 
priorities of managers (Zohar, 2010). Therefore the present study proposes that in 
addition to the direct relationship between the above outlined safety climate 
dimensions and risk behavior, the two-way interaction between management 
commitment to safety and priority of safety as found by Katz-Navon and colleagues 
(2005) will only hold when employees perceive low levels of pressure for production. 
In this particular context, employees receive enough cues regarding the importance of 
safety within their unit and the low work pressure is not at conflict with these cues; 
employees’ understanding that senior management is committed to and values safety 
will have no additional influence on their safety behavior (i.e. risk behavior). In 
contrast, when employees perceive high levels of pressure for production, their safety 
behavior will be influenced by management commitment to safety, regardless of the 
level of priority of safety on plant. Specifically, our Hypothesis 2 reads as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Management commitment to safety will be less strongly associated 
with risk behavior under conditions of high, as compared to low priority of safety on 




The added value of this study above and beyond previous research (e.g. Katz-Navon 
et al., 2005; Naveh et al., 2005) is twofold: First, we focus on employee perceptions 
of senior management rather than supervisor commitment to safety in testing the 
proposed safety climate-safety behavior relationships as senior managers play a 
critical role in shaping both employee and lower management behaviors (Simard and 
Marchand, 1995; Cooper, 2006). Second, rather than focusing on one moderator of 
the management commitment to safety-outcome relationship only, we propose the 
impact of management commitment to safety on outcomes (i.e. risk behavior) to be 
contingent not only on priority of safety but also pressure for production, thereby 
enabling us to provide a more complex picture of the interplay between different 
safety climate dimensions. This is important from a theoretical and practical 
perspective as our findings ascertain the boundary conditions under which the impact 
of managerial commitment to safety on employee risk behavior is enhanced or 
attenuated (for the relevance of moderating effects in climate research, see González-
Romá, et al., 2009), which in turn can inform managers about the situations in which 
their actions and behaviors are particularly influential for reducing employee risk 
behavior and accidents on site. To our knowledge this is the first study in the safety 
climate literature to test and find a higher-order interaction between safety climate 
dimensions, which deserves attention given the difficulty of finding higher-order 
interactions due to lower statistical power in field research (McClelland and Judd, 
1993). We also would like the reader to note that the proposed effects of safety 
climate dimensions were tested in a South African chemical manufacturing 
organization, a context very different from medical units in hospitals. The present 
study therefore clearly addresses Katz-Navon et al.’s (2005) and Naveh et al.’s (2005) 
call for future research to test the validity of their findings in other industries and to 
study additional dimensions (e.g. pressure for production) which may affect the nature 
of the relationships found among the dimensions.  
 
4.0 Method 
4.1 Participants and Procedure  
The data used in this study were collected as part of a larger research project 
to examine the effectiveness of safety management practices and procedures in 
organizations. Questionnaires in English were distributed to a random sample of 1300 
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employees working at a chemical manufacturing organization in South Africa. This 
resulted in a sample of 856 non-management employees, a response rate of 65.8%. 
Among these employees, 623 (72.8%) operated in high-risk environments in the 
chemical manufacturing organization, i.e., maintenance and production, and were 
predominantly blue collar workers (for the importance of safety climate for blue 
collar construction and maintenance workers, see Larsson et al., 2008, Morrow et al., 
2010). These employees who experience high-risk in their daily work environment 
and who are thus eligible to answer questions pertaining to safety (e.g. pressure for 
production) and risk behavior are the focus of the present study. A covering letter 
accompanied all questionnaires explaining the purpose of the survey and was 
distributed by the research team and personnel from SHE Department to the 
employees of the organization. In addition, prior to completing the questionnaires, 
employees were informed about the objectives of the investigation. Where employees 
were unable to understand English, translators were used to explain concepts. 
Respondents completed the questionnaires in hard copy and returned the completed 
questionnaires to the research team. In terms of age, 12.2% of the respondents in 
maintenance and production were between 18 and 24; 16.9% were between 25 and 
29; 14.4% were between 30 and 34; 13.8% were between 35 and 39; 14.8% were 
between 40 and 44; 13% between 45 and 49 and 14% were older than 50 years. 7 
respondents (1.1%) did not indicate their age. As far as length of service is concerned, 
45.9% of the respondents had less than five years’ service with the organization, 
19.4% had between five and ten years of service, 12.7% had between eleven and 
fifteen years of service and 18.5% of the respondents had indicated that they had more 
than 16 years of service with the organization. Twenty-two respondents (3.5%) did 
not indicate their length of service with the organization.  
 
4.2 Measures 
The research questionnaire consisted of three sections and the different sections 
elicited the following information of participants: Section 1: Background information 
(e.g. age, length of service, etc.), Section 2: Psychological safety climate questions 
and Section 3: Risk behavior. As mentioned earlier, all dimensions of safety climate 
and risk behavior were measured and analysed at the individual level as the present 
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study focuses on individual perceptions of safety climate and their role in predicting 
variation in employee risk behavior.  
 
4.2.1. Safety Climate 
Employees’ perceptions of safety climate in the organization were assessed using 26 
items from the Offshore Safety Questionnaire (OSQ), developed from previous 
research into safety climate in offshore environments (Mearns et al., 1997; Fleming, 
2001; Mearns et al., 2003). The questionnaire was chosen due to its use in previous 
studies and range of measures available (Fleming, 2001). The questionnaire was 
adapted for use in the manufacturing industry by omitting items that relate to the 
offshore oil context. Specifically, we measured the following safety dimensions: 
Management commitment to safety, status of safety on the plant, and pressure for 
production. Employees responded to all items using a 5-point Likert-type scale 
ranging from fully disagree (1) to fully agree (5). All three dimensions relate to 
perceptions of plant-level safety whereby respondents were instructed to consider 
senior management on site when questions referred to ‘managers’.  
(a) Management commitment to safety. Twelve items assessed employees’ 
perceptions of management commitment to safety
i. Example items are “Some 
safety rules/procedures are only there to protect management” and “Management 
listen to safety concerns, but nothing ever gets done”. The internal consistency 
reliability was .88.  
(b) Priority of safety on plant. Eight items assessed employees’ perceptions of the 
priority of safety on plant. Example items are “The standard of safety is very high 
at my work place” and “I am allowed to stop work if I feel the job is unsafe”. The 
internal consistency reliability was .87. 
(c) Pressure for production. Six items assessed employees’ perceptions of pressure 
for production. Example items are “Sometimes it is necessary to ignore safety 
rules/procedures to keep production going” and “People in this plant are 
sometimes under pressure to put production before safety”. The internal 
consistency reliability was .75. 
 
4.2.2. Risk behavior.  
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As the dependent measure, the survey included five items from the Offshore 
Safety Questionnaire (OSQ) to assess the extent to which employees perceived that 
they engaged in risk behavior in their work setting. These items from the OSQ were 
originally adapted from Rundmo (1997, 2000). Example items are “I sometimes 
ignore safety rules/procedures to get the job done” and “I use work methods that are 
not allowed”. Employees responded to all items using a 5-point Likert-type scale 
ranging from never (1) to very often (5). The internal consistency reliability was .80. 
 
4.3 Measure Validation.  
Confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) were carried out to investigate the 
discriminant validity of our self-reported measures. The items for risk behavior, 
management commitment to safety, priority of safety, and pressure for production 
were specified to load on four separate latent factors, while the latent factors were 
allowed to co-vary. The chi-square was statistically significant (χ2/df = 1129.97/426 = 
2.65, p <.001) but the other fit indices indicate levels of fit which are commonly used 
as indicating acceptable model fit (Lance et al., 2006); comparative fit index [CFI] = 
.90, Tucker-Lewis Index [TLI] = .89, and root-mean-square error of approximation 
[RMSEA] = .05). Factor loadings ranged from .48-.76 (risk behavior), .53-.69 
(management commitment to safety), .56-.81 (priority of safety), and .48-.67 
(pressure for production) and were all statistically significant, p < .05. Interfactor 
correlations ranged from -.43 to -.76. In addition to affirming the fit of our proposed 
four-factor model, we also tested alternative models by combining original factors to 
test discriminant validity (see Campbell and Fiske, 1959). Specifically, we tested a 
three-factor model in which risk behavior, priority of safety, and management 
commitment to safety combined with pressure for production were specified to load 
on three separate latent factors, a two-factor model in which the safety climate 
dimensions and risk behavior were specified to load on two separate latent factors, 
and a single latent factor model in which all self-reported measures were specified to 
load on one single latent factor. Chi-square difference tests were used to compare the 
alternative models. The three-factor, two-factor and single latent factor models all 
demonstrated significantly worse fit (CFIs ≤ .85, TLIs ≤ .83, RMSEAs ≥ .06) than the 
four-factor model of our self-reported measures. Comparisons of the four-factor 
model with all the alternative models using chi-square difference tests showed that the 
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proposed four-factor model of self-reported measures fitted the data best
ii
, supporting 
the discriminant validity of our measures.  
 
5.0 Results 
In Table 1 the means, standard deviations, internal consistencies and zero-order 
correlations of all variables are displayed. We carried out hierarchical regression 
analyses to test our hypotheses. The included predictor variables were centered 
around their grand mean to facilitate the interpretation of main effects in models 
containing interaction terms (see Aiken and West, 1991).  
 
Insert Table 1 
 
We entered the predictors into the regression in the following four steps: (1) Age, 
function, contract type and length of service as control variables, (2) Management 
commitment to safety (MCS), priority of safety on plant (SP), and pressure for 
production (PP) as predictor variables, (3) the two-way interactions, and (4) the three-
way interaction.  
 
Insert Table 2 
 
Table 2 displays the results of the regression analysis. The results demonstrated that 
the direct effects of management commitment to safety, priority of safety on plant, 
and pressure for production on employees’ self-reported risk behavior were 
significant (see Model 2). Consistent with Hypothesis 1, management commitment to 
safety and priority of safety were negatively related to risk behavior whereas pressure 
for production was positively related to risk behavior. In addition, the results 
demonstrated that the three-way interaction of management commitment to safety, 
priority of safety, and pressure for production was significant (see Model 4), beta = - 
3.17, p = .002, explaining an additional 1.2% of the variance. The interaction pattern 
will be presented in Figure 1.  
 
In order to carry out a more specific test of our interaction hypothesis (see Hypothesis 
2), we conducted simple slope analyses as suggested by Aiken and West (1991) as 
14 
 
well as slope difference tests as suggested by Dawson and Richter (2006). When 
pressure for production was low (see Figure 1), management commitment to safety 
was not related to risk behavior under conditions of high priority of safety on plant 
(beta = .02, p = .74) but negatively related to risk behavior under conditions of low 
priority of safety on plant (beta = -.25, p < .001). Further, these two slopes differed 
significantly from each other (t = 3.18, p = .002). 
 
Insert Figure 1  
 
When pressure for production was high (see Figure 2), management commitment to 
safety was negatively related to risk behavior under conditions of high priority of 
safety on plant (beta = -.25, p < .001) as well as under conditions of low priority of 
safety on plant (beta = -.18, p = .008). The difference between the slopes was not 
significant (t = -0.75, p = .46). These results are consistent with our Hypothesis 2. 
 
Insert Figure 2 
 
6.0 Discussion 
Although there is a large body of research on the safety climate-safety outcome 
relationship (for an overview, see Beus et al., 2010), the interrelationships among 
specific safety climate dimensions and their impact on safety performance are 
regarded as contradictory and unclear and therefore require additional research 
(Naveh et al., 2005; Beus et al., 2010). The present study adopts a multi-dimensional 
approach to safety climate (Cooper and Philips, 2004; Zohar and Luria, 2005) and 
demonstrates (1) the differential direct impact of these safety climate dimensions 
(management commitment to safety, priority of safety, pressure for production) on 
risk behavior and (2) a complex relationship between these three safety climate 
dimensions in influencing unsafe behavior at work. In support of our hypothesis, and 
in line with previous research examining their impact on safety performance, we 
found that employee risk behavior was negatively related to management 
commitment and priority of safety, and positively related to pressure for production 
(see Hypothesis 1). The more employees perceive that an organization considers 
safety to be an important issue which must be given priority (Naveh et al., 2005) and 
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that (senior) management engages in communication and actions that support safety 
(Christian et al., 2009), the less they will engage in risk behavior. Managerial 
behavior provides cues regarding workplace norms (Morrow et al., 2010) as well as 
which kind of behavior is likely to be supported, valued or rewarded (Zohar, 2003). 
Similarly when employees perceive that aspects such as safety policies, procedures 
and management systems are relevant, effective and given priority over competing 
demands, they are less inclined to engage in risk behavior (Fleming, 1999; Cooper, 
2000). In contrast perceived tensions between meeting production deadlines and 
adhering to safety procedure (i.e. pressure for production) may cause employees to 
sacrifice safety and engage in risk behavior. This tension can have a direct effect on 
accident risk as employees who perceive that they are under pressure to increase 
production may deviate from safety rules that impede their progress or perform tasks 
with less care, thereby increasing the likelihood of accidents (Clarke and Cooper, 
2004).  
 
Finally, we demonstrated that these three safety climate dimensions interacted, 
supporting our assumption that the moderating effect of safety priority on the 
relationship between management commitment to safety and safety outcomes as 
found by Katz-Navon and colleagues (2005) depends upon the level of pressure for 
production within the organization (see Hypothesis 2). In other words, similar to 
Katz-Navon et al (2005) we found that when priority given to safety was high the 
impact of managerial commitment to safety on employees’ risk behavior was 
nullified; however, in contrast to these researchers we expected and found this effect 
only for conditions where employees experienced low levels of pressure for 
production. In this particular context, employees received enough cues regarding the 
importance of safety within their unit and the low work pressure was not at conflict 
with these cues; the understanding that management also emphasized and valued 
safety had no additional influence on employees’ behavior. In contrast, under 
conditions where employees experienced high levels of pressure for production, 
management commitment to safety was still influential regardless of high versus low 
priority of safety on plant. Therefore when conflict exists between pressure for 
production and priority of safety, employees look to their managers for cues to guide 
their own safety behavior. As managers have a direct bearing on the jobs and 
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allocated rewards of employees (Morrow et al., 2010), an employees’ likelihood to 
engage in risk behavior is reduced when their manager is highly committed to safety 
despite a high demand for workplace productivity. Overall, the results of the three-
way interaction between the three safety climate dimensions suggest that senior 
management commitment to safety was influential in reducing risk behavior in 
“unideal” situations (e.g. ambiguity, not enough cues regarding importance of safety, 
role conflict) but not “ideal” situations.  
 
7.0 Limitations and Future Research 
There are a number of issues with the current research that deserve attention. 
Foremost among them is the small effect of the three-way interaction. Although this 
effect accounted for only 1.2% of the variance in employees’ risk behavior, we feel 
that it is meaningful for the following reasons. Relative to experimentalists, field 
researchers have lower statistical power and thus considerable difficulty detecting 
theorized moderator effects due to a number of factors including nonoptimal 
distributions of the component variables associated with lower residual variances of 
the product term and thus lesser efficiency of the moderator parameter estimate 
(McClelland and Judd, 1993). This is particularly true for higher order interactions. 
Thus even though the effect size of the interaction observed in the present research is 
small by conventional standards, the effect is important as the odds of detecting it 
were against us. Similarly, Evans (1985) concluded even those effects explaining as 
little as 1% of the total variance should be considered important. From a practical 
perspective this effect deserves attention for two reasons. First, the impact of 
supervisors and plant managers’ behaviors on worker safety is believed to operate in a 
more direct fashion than that of the less visible and more remote senior managers 
(Thompson et al., 1998), suggesting that the correlation between perceived 
managerial commitment to safety and employee risk behavior is more distal for the 
latter than the former group of managers. Therefore even the small effect of our three-
way interaction might indicate that (senior) management commitment to safety has an 
important impact on employee risk behavior, contingent on priority of safety and 
pressure for production. Second, following Cortina and Landis’s (2009) logic, such 
effects may appear small if observed in a snapshot but might have significant 
cumulative consequences for (un) safe employee behavior and accidents if considered 
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across a large number of situations, organizations and/or over time. Another issue that 
needs to be addressed is the collection of data from the same respondents using self-
report measures, as the mono-method approach is believed to distort (typically inflate) 
correlations among the key variables (e.g. Lance and Vandenberg, 2009; Lance et al., 
2010). Although it could be argued that any inflated correlations due to common 
method variance are counterbalanced by the attenuating effect of measurement error 
as demonstrated by Lance and colleagues (2010), it is advisable that future studies 
testing the observed relationships in the present study also employ a hetero-method 
approach and procedural methods of control, believed to reduce common method 
variance (see Podsakoff et al., 2012). For example, archival data on accidents could 
be used as a proxy for risk behavior instead of self-reported measures. Ratings of risk 
behavior by co-workers and supervisors could also be used in addition to observation 
of safety behavior on site. Other research, however, has shown that self-reported 
unsafe behaviors and accidents are related to independent observations of the same 
variables (Lusk et al., 1995). In addition, any social desirability concerns on the part 
of employees are believed to suppress variance on these measures such that 
employees would tend to underestimate rather than overestimate unsafe behaviors and 
accidents (Hofmann and Stelzer, 1996; Probst and Estrada, 2010). Thus, social 
desirability concerns among employees presumably counterbalance any possible 
inflated correlations between our safety climate predictors and outcome variable, i.e., 
risk behavior, due to common method bias.  
 
Our study is also restricted to three dimensions of safety climate (Mearns et al., 1997; 
Fleming, 2001) and one measure of unsafe behavior (i.e. risk behavior). Future 
research should identify and investigate other safety climate dimensions such as 
safety training (Zohar, 2002), safety motivation (Griffin and Neal, 2000) and safety-
specific leadership (Conchie and Donald, 2009) and examine their impact on different 
forms of safe (e.g. pro-active safety behavior), and unsafe behaviors (e.g. non-
compliance), using not only a cross-sectional but also longitudinal design. A 
longitudinal assessment would provide further validation of the found relationships 
and also test for causation. In addition, we advise researchers to investigate if the 
results of this study hold for all types of industries (Coyle et al., 1995; Cooper and 
Philips, 2004;). Finally, in contrast to Naveh et al. (2005) the present study focused on 
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employees’ perceptions of senior management rather than direct supervisor 
commitment to safety. As previously mentioned, these groups have different roles, 
with senior management focusing on safety policy-making and the establishment of 
safety procedures to facilitate policy implementation, and supervisors executing these 
procedures (Zohar and Luria, 2005). To date research that considers perceptions of 
both senior managers and direct supervisors simultaneously is sparse and yields 
contradictory findings regarding the impact of different management levels on 
employee safety behavior (e.g. Andriessen, 1978; Simard and Marchand, 1995; Zohar 
and Luria, 2005; Cooper, 2006). Building on our findings, future research could 
address commitment to safety at both management levels in order to see if the found 
interaction among the safety climate dimensions holds for senior and front line 
managers, and investigate whether either takes precedence when pressure for 
production is high or low. In other words, when employees experience work-safety 
tension or role conflict, which group is the most influential safety referent to guide 
employee safety behavior? In line with O’Dea and Flin (2001) we therefore 
encourage researchers to disentangle the differential effects of senior management 
and direct supervisors and their relative impact on safety, possibly employing a 
multilevel model of climate (see Zohar and Luria, 2005) and collecting data also from 
supervisors and top management.  
 
8.0 Implications for Management  
According to our findings, the three dimensions of safety climate have a direct 
influence on employee risk behavior. Therefore activities which promote managerial 
commitment and priority of safety, and minimise pressure for production should be 
enacted and encouraged within organizations to reduce the occurrence of risk 
behavior by employees. More specifically for organizations the three-way interaction 
found between the three safety dimensions demonstrate that when employees 
experience tension between their production deadlines and safety procedures, they are 
less likely to engage in risk behavior when managerial commitment to safety is 
perceived to be high. In other words, senior management commitment to safety is 
particularly critical for minimizing employee risk behavior when there is perceived 
pressure to ignore or even break safety rules. Therefore from a practical perspective 
senior management may need to re-evaluate their role in the safety process and move 
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beyond safety policy formulation to that of a safety change agent (Buchanan & 
Storey, 1997). This may be especially relevant when trying to reduce risk behavior 
amongst blue collar workers who are subject to highly pressurised production quotas. 
Managers' discourse may appear insincere if employees perceive that the job duties do 
not allow for safe working (Morrow et al., 2010). Given the perceived differences in 
status, power and prestige between management and employees, employees scrutinise 
the behavior of senior management for evidence that management are not committed 
towards safety, that safety is not a priority or that production targets should be met at 
all costs. This may impact on their levels of motivation to work safely or their 
willingness to engage in pro-active safety behavior. Zohar (2010) describes this as a 
social learning process whereby employees interpret the organizational environment 
by repeatedly observing (and exchanging information with) their leader (Dragoni, 
2005). The extent to which employees’ scrutinize managerial actions with regard to 
safety can be emphasised using managerial safety training, which emphasize the 
manager’s role as a safety referent (Beus et al., 2010). As employees look to 
managerial behavior in situations of productivity-safety tensions, managers should 
demonstrate their commitment to safety through both communications and actions 
(i.e. regularly talk about safety, investment of resources in creating safe work 
environment, consideration in job design decisions, rewarding safe behavior etc.). In 
addition, the findings of our research suggest that managers who intend to design 
safety interventions should target all three safety climate dimensions in order to 
ensure safety. As mentioned by Katz-Navon and colleagues (2005) interventions that 
aim to improve only part of the three dimensions are unlikely to be as effective, since 
the dimensions are interrelated and together they influence employees’ risk behavior 
and should be managed as such.  
 
In sum our findings demonstrate the direct and interactive effects of safety climate 
dimensions on risk behavior which (a) broaden our understanding of safety climate as 
a multi-dimensional construct and (b) highlight the importance of examining higher-
order interactions between dimensions of safety climate in predicting (un)safe 
employee behavior. Specifically, our study has identified boundary conditions under 
which the impact of managerial commitment to safety on employee risk behavior is 
enhanced or attenuated which in turn can inform managers about the situations in 
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which their actions and behaviors are particularly influential for reducing employee 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations Among the Study Variables 
Variables M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Risk Behavior 1.68 .85 (.80) 
 
       
2. Age 5.04 2.08 -.09* -       
3. Function
 a
  .74 .44 .12** -.02 -      
4. Contact Type
 b
  .31 .46 .05 -.33** .09* -     
5. Service Length 2.04 1.17 .05  .54** .04 -.39** -    
6. MCS -.07 1.01 -.48** .11** -.14** -.05 .07 (.88)   
7. SP -.02 .95 -.45** .06 -.07 .02 .01 .36** (.87)  
8. PP .11 1.10 .52** -.18** .09* .03 -.06 -.58** -.34** (.75) 
  
Note. N = 623. Cronbach’s Alphas are indicated in parentheses. MCS = Management Commitment to Safety, SP = Safety Priority on Plant, PP = 
Pressure for Production  
a 
0 = Maintenance, 1 = Production  
b 
0 = Permanent, 1 = Temporary 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05 
30 
 
Table 2: Results of Hierarchical/Moderated Regression Analyses (Standardized beta 
coefficients) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Control Variables     
1. Age -.16** -.05 -.06 -.07 
2. Function
 a
 .10* .03 .02 .03 
3. Contact Type
 b
 .05 .08* .07 .07 
4. Service Length .15** .13** .13** .13** 
Predictor variables     
1. MCS  -.20*** -.18*** -.19*** 
2. SP  -.25*** -.23*** -.27*** 
3. PP  .32*** .33*** .36*** 
4. MCS x SP   .05 .07 
5. MCS x PP   -.07 -.06 
6. SP x PP   -.07 -.10* 
7. MCS x SP x PP    -.14** 
∆R² .04 .35 .02 .01 
∆F 5.41*** 110.38*** 6.23*** 10.05** 
Dfs     
Notes. 
a 
0 = Maintenance, 1 = Production 
b 
0 = Permanent, 1 = Temporary MCS = 
Management Commitment to Safety, SP = Safety Priority on Plant, PP = Pressure for 
Production  





 Figure 1: Employee risk behavior as a function of priority of safety, given low 





















 Figure 2: Employee risk behavior as a function of priority of safety, given high pressure 





















                                                          
i One of the twelve items indicative of management commitment to safety scale in our study 
used the referent “supervisor” instead of “management”. In Mearns et al. (2003)’s study, 
which employed the OSQ in order to investigate safety climate, safety practice, and safety 
performance in offshore environments, the factor solution revealed this item to load onto the 
factor (senior) management commitment and therefore we also decided to keep this item.   
 
ii
 Results of the alternative model comparisons are available upon request from the first 
author.  
 
